INTRODUCTION
…Criminal law allows for the most severe intrusions into individual rights.
Therefore, the notion of criminal law embodies, above all, questions of legitimacy and of individual rights and guarantees. 1 Criminal law theorists have attempted to devise principles to delimit the types of behaviour which ought, or more importantly ought not, to be subject to the criminal sanction. The enactment of legislation both in England/Wales and Scotland which makes it an offence to smoke in certain places raises issues as to the appropriate scope of the criminal law. In this paper the anti-smoking legislation is used to critique two leading criminalisation theories, 1 H Jung ' "L'etat et moi": some reflections on the relationship between the criminal law and the state ' (1998) it is legitimate for the law to attempt to prevent people from self-harming. This may involve a range of legal measures, including criminal prohibitions. Such an approach is, however, abhorrent to many people: legal paternalism has been described as 'a distasteful and insulting practice, without any redeeming features.' 5 Some anti-paternalists reject interference by the state in any form, hence criticise all types of legislation which is motivated by a desire to save people from their own (informed) choices. Others, however, are concerned to limit paternalistic criminal laws, but are not necessarily opposed to other legal measures, such as the state's attempt to deter or reduce certain self-harming behaviours by increased taxation, licensing laws, or other forms of regulation. This is an important disctinction, which should be borne in mind in discussions concerning criminalisation. The 19 th century liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill was opposed to state interference, in general. 6 He cautioned that the individual ought not to … be compelled to do or forebear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right... his independence is … absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 7 It followed from this that neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own well-being... 8 .
Focussing on the criminal law, in particular, a similar idea has been more colourfully expressed by Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, for whom 'man has an inalienable right to be a violation of another person's rights. 16 This was to ensure that those set-backs to interest which were generally regarded as legitimate were not regarded as 'harms' from the perspective of the criminal law. For example, an aggressor who is killed or injured by someone who acted to defend herself has undoubtedly sustained a set-back to his interests, but has not been 'wronged' or 'harmed' according to Feinberg's analysis. Interfering with a person's autonomy, with her right to self-govern, can also be regarded as a harm. This justifies many offences which are committed 'against the (physical) person' (including many sexual offences, and assault), but also property offences such as theft, robbery, fraud, and vandalism, in which there is unjustifiable interference with the rights of the property owner or custodier. 17 Harm/risk of harm is generally regarded as a necessary condition, but for some authors, including Mill and Feinberg, it is a positive reason for criminalising ('if conduct risks harm-criminalise it'), while for others it is rather that its absence precludes criminalisation ('if there is no risk of harm, criminalisation cannot be justified'). In either case, harm in itself is insufficient to justify criminalisation; it may be too trivial or the chances of it occurring too remote, or the cost of criminalisation (to the state and/or the perpetrator of the harm) may outweigh the deterrent benefits of criminalisation.
Furthermore, many types of harm are regarded as being unsuitable for criminalisation because they are not created intentionally, or even recklessly. 18 Such cases of negligent or in every case, but because they create unreasonable risks of harm to other persons': iIbid, p 11. 16 Ibid, p 36. See also ibid, p 109. For an argument that Feinberg ought not to have Review 47, in which the author argues the contrary; that Feinberg erred in not sufficiently separating 'setbacks to interest' from 'wrongdoing'. 17 Robbery could be considered as an offence 'against the person', rather than a property offence, but is generally treated as involving dishonesty, hence as being within the latter category. 18 Of course, the focus on 'harms' begs the question why it is that the criminal law should focus on harms, as opposed to 'offence', 'disorder' or even 'inconvenience'. For a careless harm-causing does not generally warrant the severe condemnation which is characteristic of the criminal law. Compensation may be require, but not punishment, and the matter is better dealt with by the law of tort/delict. 19 At other times, the interest being harmed is not one which is regarded as being a matter of public concern, hence is not within the purview of the criminal law (e.g. a breach of contract, which is regarded as a private matter). As we shall see, the fact that criminalisation involves condemnation is generally regarded as one of its key features: the criminal law does not aim merely to deter unwanted or undesirable conduct, but to label the behaviour, and thus the person responsible for it, as blameworthy. 20 
ANTI-SMOKING LEGISLATION
The prohibition on smoking in England and Wales is to be found in the Health Act 2006, s 7(2) which provides that: 'A person who smokes in a smoke-free place commits an offence.' 21 The equivalent Scottish provision is the Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005, s 2(1). This refers to 'no-smoking premises' rather than 'a smoke-free place' but is otherwise identical to the English legislation. 22 Both Acts also make it an offence for the manager of such premises to fail to prevent smoking (England), or discussion on this, see MD Dubber 'Theories of crime and punishment in German criminal law ' (2005) Scotland the Scottish Ministers were given power to prescribe 'no-smoking premises' by regulations, 27 and this applies to 'premises which are wholly or substantially enclosed', 'to which the public… has access'; or which are being used 'as a place of work', 'by and for the purposes of a club or other unincorporated association'; 'for the provision of education or of health or care services '. 28 Many other countries have similar legislation. For example, smoking bans operate in Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain and the United States of America. 29 Some countries have gone further than the UK and have criminalised smoking in selected outdoor areas.
These include some Australian beaches, bus and tram stops, and certain Japanese streets. It seems that Bhutan has the most restrictive legislation, having prohibited smoking in all circumstances, as well as the sale of tobacco. Bhutan is an absolute monarchy, but in a democracy like Britain it is generally accepted that there must be some limits on the criminal law sanction.
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
How did the legislatures attempt to justify these prohibitions? Both in the Westminster and Scottish parliaments the debates focussed on the harmful effects which smoking can have on third parties, particularly non-smokers, but at times the rhetoric stressed the need to protect the health of smokers themselves. Rarely was there much discussion of the implications of criminalisation. In respect of the Scottish legislation the Scottish Deputy Minister for Health emphasised that: 'The bill is not about banning tobacco; it is about protecting people's health.' 30 She employed the liberal rhetoric of rights and freedomsarguing that the legislation would 'increase the choice that is available to the vast majority of the people of Scotland, who do not smoke' 31 and that it 'aims to offer freedom to enjoy the pleasures of life… in a smoke-free atmosphere. In short, the bill offers a healthier way of living… '. 32 Similarly, the Minister for Health commented that: 'The smoking provisions are pro-clean air and pro-choice.' 33 There was only one explicit mention of the criminal law -MSP Brian Monteith pointed out that 'people will be turned into criminals because they choose to smoke in enclosed spaces', 34 and only one reference to the need to balance the conflicting freedoms of smokers and non-smokers. 35 The debate on the English legislation was rather more sophisticated, with one MP Liberals accept that there may be distress, perhaps even considerable distress, to others as well as financial consequences to society from those who take risks with their own health (such as helmet-less bikers, drivers who fail to wear seat-belts and, presumably, smokers) but argue that these adverse effects should not count as 'harms' worthy of protection by the harm principle. This is a contentious issue -is it reasonable to insist that only those harms which liberals want to protect ought to be regarded as the 'right' sort of harm? Some have questioned this approach and accused the harm principle of being illiberal. 55 For the liberal, the solution is for bikers who wish to ride without protective headgear to be required to purchase additional insurance. This would provide financial compensation to the injured, paid for by those who want the freedom to ride without a helmet, rather than by the tax payer, thus enhancing liberty 'while financially protecting others from the harmful consequences of the exercise of that liberty.' 56 In similar vein, rather than criminalise smoking, society could enact legislation which requires smokers to take out private insurance policies to pay for their medical care should they suffer from a smoking-related illness, in future. Of course, some bikers or smokers may fail to take out insurance, and society may need to criminalise their failure to do so. Referring to the uninsured biker, Feinberg assured us of the compassionate nature of liberalism, noting that it would be 'unthinkable that we leave the reckless, bareheaded, young motorcyclist to die in his own pool of blood because he has not contributed to the costs of his own care'. 57
Since society provides medical care to injured bikers (or smokers) regardless of their insurance position, criminalisation of a failure to take out the requisite insurance could be justified on the view that this type of omission constitutes a breach of civic responsibility, and can be condemned and punished as such. 58
One can see the attractions of insurance schemes; applying it to smokers would reduce the financial harm caused to society by smoking-related illnesses and deaths. It may, however, be suggested that it is not the financial costs to society which is the dominant harm here. Our main concern when hundreds of thousands of people suffer and/or die from smoking-induced illnesses is surely not that the rest of us have to pay for their medical care or their dependents, but the very fact that they are suffering, and may die from, these horrific illnesses. Here, paternalism is based on compassion. Furthermore, it may be suggested that the liberal vision of society does not reflect the way things really are. As John Kleinig has highlighted:
Our lives do not always display the cohesion and maturity of purpose that exemplifies the liberal idea of individuality, but instead manifest a carelessness, argued that breaches of regulations which 'serve the common good' are breaches 'of our civic responsibilities … which merit condemnation as wrongs'.
but also represents a departure from some of our own more permanent and central commitments and dispositions. That is characteristic of the self-regarding vices, and most of us are prey to some. On many occasions, the consequences of such lapses and deviations will not be serious, and we must wear them as best we can.
But sometimes because of our actions, consequences of a more catastrophic kind may become inevitable or considerably more probable, consequences that would be quite disproportionate to the conduct's value for us. This we may fail to appreciate, not because we are incapable of it, but because of our lack of discipline, our impulsiveness, or our tendency to rationalize the risks involved. It would not take much to act more prudently, yet we are inclined to negligence. 59
Thus while the liberal approach is predicated on a citizenry of rational beings, each of whom is (in theory) capable of determining where his or her best interests lie and acting accordingly, the paternalist would argue that in reality people sometimes do need to be saved from akrasia, from their own ill-considered choices. This is particularly so when the choice is not a fully autonomous one, due to addiction. Anthony Ogus has suggested that paternalism may be justified by what he calls 'ex ante rationalisation'. He used gambling rather than smoking as an example, but the two addictions are analogous:
Suppose … I am a compulsive gambler. I also know, from past experience, that I lose much more frequently than I win with, as a consequence, significant financial losses. Rationally, if I know that I find it difficult to resist temptation, then it is quite reasonable for me to take the view that it is in my own longer-term interest for my wife or someone else to stop me going to a casino, or at least to make it hard for me to do so. It is a short step from this to the notion that, as an exercise of personal autonomy, I might ex ante consent to the state creating legal barriers to my gambling opportunities. 60 The desire to be saved from one's self has been referred to by James Buchanan as Looking at both probability (the likelihood that the harm materialises) and impact (the magnitude of any harm which would be caused thereby), the risk posed by repeated exposure to smoke is undoubtedly a substantial one. If A, one of my colleagues, smokes 20 cigarettes per day for 20 years while sharing a workspace with me, we can readily conclude that A's behaviour puts me at substantial risk of harm, in terms of both probability and impact. By contrast, although the impact of the risk remains the same, it is impossible to quantify its probability when a smoker lights up a cigarette on any given occasion. If B, one of my students, smokes while in conversation with me in the corridor, but only does so on one occasion, the risk to my health from this encounter must be very small. Of course, the problem with this approach is that without some sort of prohibition it would not merely be one student who might smoke in the corridor, several alphabets worth of students would be likely to behave in the same way, and soon my situation is similar to that in the first example. But from the point of view of the smoker -the person whose smoking may be in breach of the criminal law -there is a clear difference in the health risk A offers me from prolonged exposure, on the one hand, and the surely tiny risk B offers me from one instance of smoking in my presence.
The smoking prohibitions are not unique in criminalising small probabilities of harm where the potential impact is high. For example, often a driver who exceeds the speed limit or drives through a red light will be putting others or another at a high risk of injury; if is high and so too is the probability of the risk occurring. However, the situation is different where a driver behaves in the same fashion at 3 a.m. The impact remains static, but the probability of its occurrence may be very low indeed. Nonetheless, the prohibition still applies. These types of offences involve what Antony Duff has called 'implicit endangerment', since there is no reference to harm in the wording of the offence provisions themselves, and no requirement that the prosecution show that anyone was actually endangered by the defendant's behaviour. 71 There is, of course, a difference between the speeding driver and the smoker, in that the harm caused by the driver can be directly attributed to the speeding, whereas the errant smoker makes a small contribution to a cumulative risk or harm. The law's concern is with the aggregate risk, whether this is posed by smoker A to certain (identifiable) others, or by smoker B plus many other smokers to many (identifiable and unidentifiable) others. But the actual behaviour which the legislation is proscribing is not the cumulative effect, but each instance of smoking.
Of course, not all risky behaviour is the subject of a criminal prohibition. Each time I walk along a street, every person who is driving a car down that street at that time exposes me to a risk of substantial harm. It is a low probability risk, a risk which is extremely unlikely to materialise, but so is the risk offered by one instance of smoking in my presence. Driving is regarded as a socially valuable activity. Speeding and driving through red lights are not. We see then that the social utility of the risky behaviour is an important factor in criminalisation. A can even expose B to great risk, in terms of both impact and probability -a surgeon performing a high risk operation on a patient who is certain to die without the procedure is one example of this -but the law does not regard this as wrongful since 'they cover conduct that "typically creates a concrete danger", whether or not that danger was in fact created by the particular conduct in question.' See Dubber, above n 18, at 692. 72 Paternalism has a role here: the fact that smoking is harmful to the smoker is an important basis for our judgment that it is not a valuable activity.
That the criminal law aggregates risk can be seen in other aspects of road traffic legislation, such as those which require lorries to comply with weight restrictions. By itself, an over-weigh lorry may be unlikely to cause a bridge to crack, but repeated flouting of the law by many lorries will eventually cause the bridge to fail, and it is this risk which the law is concerned to avoid. The prohibitions against dropping litter 73 or polluting the air with chimney smoke 74 provide further examples of criminalisation based on cumulative effect; one piece of litter or one smoky chimney does little harm, but without a prohibition there is a danger that a great many people would act similarly, and this becomes problematic.
It must be borne in mind that, for the liberal, the fact that conduct causes or risks harm to others is a necessary but not a sufficient ground for criminalising it. Husak has specified that violations of criminal laws must result in punishments that are 'deserved'. On the face of it, this overlaps with the idea that the conduct must be 'wrongful', but if it is to have value as a separate criterion then it may mean that an accused person who unwittingly breaches a prohibition ought not to be punished. In the context of the smoking prohibition this would seem to be satisfied by the provision of a defence for the accused who did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know, that the place in question was a nosmoking/smoke free premise. Such a defence is indeed provided in both the English and Scottish legislation. 75 He also stipulated that the state had to have a 'substantial interest' in reducing or preventing the unwanted behaviour in question. 76 designed to advance that interest directly. 77 Husak's final criterion for criminalisation is that prohibitions should be no more extensive than necessary to achieve their purpose. 78 Many of the ill effects of passive smoking could be eliminated by proscribing smoking in enclosed public places only when a non-smoking third party is present, and the legislation could have been worded accordingly. Since smoke tends to linger long after a cigarette is finished, it may be argued that the difficulties the alternative wording would pose in practice make a broader prohibition more appropriate.
Smoking endangers other people in several ways; its harmful effects are not limited to those caused by passive smoking. Each year about 200 people are killed, and ten times that number seriously injured in smoking related fires in the UK, the vast majority of which occur in the home. 79 Sudden infant death is more common in children whose parents smoke and, according to the Royal College of Physicians, about a quarter of such deaths can be attributed to parental smoking. 80 Even without recourse to arguments about fires and cot deaths, it seems to be accepted that the home is the major source of exposure to smoke for most adults -and this was so even before the ban on public smoking. 81 It is now being suggested that there is a health risk from 'third-hand' smoke -'residue from tobacco smoke which clings to upholstery, clothing and the skin' which 'releases cancer-causing agents'. 82 The risk of harm to others from second-hand, or even third-hand, smoke could 77 The fact that in the UK the NHS meets the bill for smoking-related illnesses provides an additional reason for suggesting that there is a substantial state interest in such legislation, but the state's primary interest lies in the fact that the criminal law serves to protect citizens against harm -Husak himself notes that 'the prevention of physical harm will qualify as compelling and, a fortiori, as substantial': ibid, p 138. The public/private dichotomy has been criticised by feminist scholars, in particular, who point out that the law's historic failure to regulate certain aspects of the private realm allowed men to abuse their wives, physically and sexually, with impunity. 85 Whether or not a behaviour such as smoking in the home ought to be proscribed cannot be decided solely on the basis that it is a private matter: the home is the individual's private sphere, hence ought always to be free from the reach of the criminal law. Several forms of behaviour, such as assaulting other people and cruelty to animals, are regarded as properly 83 It might be suggested that the prohibition should be extended to criminalise smoking at home in the presence of any non-smoking third party, but the non-smoker could generally choose to leave the smoke-filled environment, an option which the smoker's children do not have. criminalised, even if the locus is the home. The descriptors 'public' and 'private' should be applied following deliberation as to the respective values which are at stake if the behaviour in question is criminalised. 86 If the law is justified in proscribing certain potential harms, irrespective of whether this is perpetrated in public or in private, then it may also be justified in proscribing smoking in the presence of others, even in the home.
There seems little to distinguish a prohibition on being drunk while in charge of one's children, and a prohibition on smoking in their presence. This suggests that a wider prohibition -one which extended to vehicles and indeed the home -may in principle be justified, though of course there may be difficulties in enforcing such a proscription.
These arguments offer at least a prima facie case for the state intervening in order to limit smoking to protect third parties. However, as in our discussion of legal paternalism, many of the arguments made thus far show only that the state is justified in intervening, but not that the state is entitled to employ the criminal law for this purpose. The evils associated with the criminal sanction (the financial and social costs of both prosecution and punishment) mean that it is generally preferable for the state to discourage unwanted behaviours by non-criminal means. As previously noted, this may include increased taxation, educational programmes, and the like. Criminal prohibitions are legitimate only when they are the best mechanism, which means that the onus is on legislators to show that all other avenues to deter the unwanted behaviour would be less successful. 87 Stud 207 and Husak, above n 3. He ultimately concludes that while this is a useful criterion, it is insufficient in itself to stem the tide of over-criminalisation.
hospitality industry but it 'failed to protect the majority of staff or customers'. 88 Cigarettes have also been the target of many tax increases and there is evidence that increasing their price does reduce the number being smoked. 89 An alternative solution to the problem of passive smoking may be to impose swingeing taxes on cigarettes. As against this, however, it may be suggested that non-criminal measures are not always more appropriate than criminal ones. Increased taxes may be less fair than the creation of a criminal prohibition, since taxing cigarettes disproportionately targets those who can least afford to pay while permitting more affluent members of society to continue smoking; if taxation levels are to act as an effective deterrent, they must be set at a sufficiently high level such that smoking becomes unaffordable for the vast majority of people. This is tantamount to banning smoking for the majority, while leaving the wealthy unaffected. By contrast, the criminal law does not discriminate against people in its initial application; poorer people may struggle to pay monetary penalties for smoking, more so than those who are financially better off, but the initial decision to prosecute a violation takes no account of ability to pay:
all who flout the law receive a criminal conviction, rich and poor alike.
A chief concern for many liberals is that excessive punishment results from there being too many criminal prohibitions on the statute books. 90 As previously noted, the punishment for breaching the UK smoking prohibitions is confined to a fine, with no option for imprisonment, and in practice a fixed penalty of £50 is offered at first instance. 91 This is a low penalty which can hardly be described as the 'harsh treatment and censure' which was the object of critique by liberals such as Husak. Nonetheless, given that imprisonment is not an option, there is an argument that some form of administrative action could have been employed in preference to the criminal law. The creation of no-smoking places could 88 Royal College of Physicians, above n 45, p 8. employed by the member state. This is illustrated by Schmautzer v Austria. 99 The Austrian system treated failure to wear a seat-belt as an administrative matter, dealt with by means of a fine, rather than a criminal offence. This was held by the ECtHR to be, in essence, a criminal charge. Thus criminal law procedural safeguards applied; those who wished to contest an allegation that they had breached the relevant provisions had a right to have this determined by means of a criminal trial.
It seems, then, that so long as it allowed 'offenders' to challenge the imposition of civil penalties before the courts, a legislature could attempt to resolve the problem of smoking in certain public places by means of administrative fines, rather than criminal ones. This would remove the condemnation and stigma that attach to a criminal conviction, while nonetheless making it clear that smoking was prohibited in certain locations. A major problem with this approach, however, is that arguably condemnation and stigma are appropriate here; without this, the fines for breaching the prohibitions become more of a taxation system, albeit imposed on a less systematic basis. Focusing on the economic costs of criminalisation, in general, has led to the suggestion that: 'If private or administrative law solutions can provide the requisite degree of control, and can do so at a lower cost, then there is likely to be a presumption that they represent a better approach than criminalization.' 100 This fails, however, to recognise that there is more at stake than the costs involved in deterring conduct. The criminal law is an appropriate, perhaps the appropriate, response when the behaviour in question is one which is deemed to have been 'wrongful'. 101 'Wrongfulness' is a concept whose meaning varies from generation to generation, and the law may lead the way in changing people's attitudes towards particular conduct. Just as the decriminalisation of gambling and homosexual behaviours has led to greater tolerance, society may come to recognise that something is harmful, and therefore a an economic view and policy implications ' (2008) violates their right to bodily integrity, the right not to be harmed or put at an unacceptable risk of harm. This does, however, presuppose that being exposed to another person's smoke is an unacceptable risk of harm -its unacceptability lying in the fact that people seem to be unwilling to accept the risk, rather than in the actual probability and magnitude of the harm, itself.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper set out to assess whether the recently enacted smoking bans in the UK were a legitimate exercise of state authority, and to use these prohibitions as an example with which to critique two leading criminalisation theories. There is little doubt that the health benefits resulting from these prohibitions have been considerable; on its first anniversary in England, a worldwide study reported that such bans have resulted in a 19% decrease in heart attack admissions to hospital. 104 In Scotland, the heart attack rate fell by 17% in the year following the legislation. 105 These types of proscription have a particularly beneficial 102 See JM Junker 'Criminalization and crimogenesis ' (1972) 106 We have seen that both paternalism and the harm principle were employed by politicians to justify the legislation, but the conclusion reached in this paper is that the argument based on paternalism is a weak one. We have also seen that non-criminal mechanisms have been tried, but with limited success, and that criminalisation may sometimes be the preferable mechanism for attempting to deter behaviour which is harmful to others, and regarded by society as wrongful. It is therefore concluded that the legislation was warranted. Nevertheless, it is disappointing that the debates in the legislatures fell short of a properly articulated case in favour of criminalisation.
So what, if any, light do the smoking prohibitions shed on the criminalisation debate? As we have noted, many regard the principle that conduct ought to be criminalised only where it harms or risks harm to others as a fundamental tenet of liberal democracy, yet there is no consensus as to what ought to count as a 'harm', and the principle tells us little about whether any particular harm which is identified as such ought to be proscribed, or tolerated. In itself, it does not specify how serious in terms of either impact or probability the risk requires to be before it should be the subject of a criminal sanction. As we noted at the outset, while some theorists regard the harm principle as a limitation on criminalisation, such that conduct should not be proscribed if it offers little risk of harm to other peoples, other theorists treat the principle as part of the argument in favour of proscription; conduct which is potentially harmful is ipso facto regarded as meriting criminalisation. 107 In 2006 107 It has been suggested that the harm principle has been used in the United States of America to justify laws against prostitution, pornography, public drinking, drugs, loitering, and various homosexual and heterosexual behaviours; see Harcourt, above n 13, at 139.
was estimated that there were more than 10,000 statutory offences in England and Wales, with 3,000 of them having been introduced within the first 11 years of the last Labour Government. 108 Enactment of a criminal prohibition has thus become the preferred response to potentially harmful (and sometimes merely anti-social) behaviour. 109 Thus we have an abundance of criminal prohibitions on the statute books, but little by way of a principled means for determining when it is appropriate to have resort to the criminal law sanction.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to develop a theory of criminalisation, but as a minimum, the starting premise for legislatures should be that any proposals involving criminal penalties require vigorous justification, based on the harm principle and the inherent wrongfulness of the behaviour which is to be proscribed. Further, those advocating the imposition of a penal sanction must articulate their reasons for believing that this is the most appropriate method for regulating the unwanted or undesirable behaviour, in terms not only of its ability to act as a deterrence, but also with regard to the fairness of its application. Donald Dripps has suggested that one way of limiting the creation of criminal offences is to focus on institutional arrangements. 110 He proposed that criminal legislation ought to require a two-thirds majority before it can be enacted. This would prevent crimes being created 'by a bare majority in the heat of popular 109 As Persak has pointed out: 'To propose a new incrimination is… the cheapest, quickest, most memorable, and media-inviting act the Member of Parliament can do -the most efficient for a legislator (securing re-election) and the least truly efficient i.e problemsolving' : above n 13, p 27. 110 Dripps, above n 13, at 11.
111 Ibid, at 12.
112 Ibid.
